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INTRODUCTION
Even after Iqbal and Twombly were decided, the Supreme
Court cases which supposedly provided better guidance on the
pleading standard lawyers use today, the legal community continued to
struggled with properly applying these pleading principles in the
courtroom.1 This confusion is not unusual, considering that the U.S.
legal system can easily be perceived as a labyrinth of obscurity with
no visible path, and even with professional expertise, the light at the
end of the tunnel is not always bright. As a result of this obscurity, a
lawyer’s first task should be to become an expert of the facts and the

 J.D. candidate, May 2022, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. My utmost thanks to Ryan Moore and Elias Gordan for their invaluable
guidance throughout my law school journey.
1 Alexander A. Reinert, The Supreme Court’s Civil Assault on Civil Procedure,
41 Hum. Rts. Mag. (2015).
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law of the case. 2 Furthermore, at the appellate stage, knowing your
case means, first and foremost, knowing the record. 3
Jose Andrade’s counsel excelled with their knowledge of the
record when advocating for their client in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.4 Jose Andrade v. City of Hammond,
Indiana, is a convoluted case about a landlord who was barred from
raising a claim in federal court after previously filing a suit and having
that suit decided, alleging the same facts but with different claims, in
state court. Specifically, the legal doctrine which was used to bar the
landlord is known as the confusing Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5
In essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine explains that federal
courts are not vested with appellate jurisdiction, aside from the
Supreme Court of the United States and are therefore barred from
reviewing final state court judgements regardless of how wrongly
decided they might appear to be.6 Interestingly, as some scholars have
pointed out, it is astonishing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is still
frequently used today by federal courts considering how infrequently
legal academics research it. 7 Some commentators have even gone so
far in comically acknowledging that Rooker-Feldman has passed away
and is buried in its graveyard hoping to never be seen again, which is
quite unfortunate.8
Nonetheless, to argue that Rooker-Feldman is unimportant
would be like saying the Earth is flat. Federal courts still heavily rely
2

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE:
THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 8 (2008).
3 Scalia & Garner, supra, note 2 at 8.
4 See Andrade v. Hammond, Indiana, 9 F.4th 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2021).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 952
7 Dustin E. Buehler, Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doctrine to
State Court Interlocutory Orders, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (2009), (Nov. 15, 2021,
3:45 PM),
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol36/iss3/2.
8 See Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 317, 317
(2006). Bray wrote a satirical obituary: “Rooker-Feldman, the legal personality, died
yesterday at his home in Washington D.C. He was 83.”.
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on Rooker-Feldman to rid themselves of cases that further augment
their filled dockets.9 This is true even though the Supreme Court has
stated that Rooker-Feldman should not be a federal court’s first
instinct when a federal lawsuit overlaps with an earlier lawsuit in state
court.10
Part I of this Article will explain what the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine is, the intricacies of it, and the reasons why the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the correct test when analyzing it.
Part II will explain how the Seventh Circuit correctly differentiated the
Andrade case from other similar cases when applying RookerFeldman. Part III will explain the next steps of Andrade, specifically
in connection to the preclusion doctrine, and additional comments
from both parties after the Seventh Circuit decision.
Rooker-Feldman
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine originated from two landmark
cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 11 and District of Colombia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman,12 which helped solidify principles not explicitly
stated in the U.S. Code. The first provision addressed in the cases is
Title 28 of the United States Code Section 1257, which states that:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of
a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where
9

Beuhler, supra note 1, at 375.
Andrade, 9 F.4th at 951.
11 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Rooker is discussed in
detail infra, page 4.
12 D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Feldman is discussed
in detail infra, page 4.
10
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any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or
any commission held or authority exercised under, the United
States.13
The second code provision at issue is Title 28 of the United States
Code Section 1331 which states that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”14
The rule from these two provisions, while not explicitly stated,
is that federal courts are barred from reviewing final state court
judgements regardless of how wrong they might be, and further that
only the Supreme Court may review a final state court judgement.15
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., argued in 1923, involved a
married couple who transferred the deed to their house to a bank, the
Fidelity Trust Company, in exchange for a loan that they ultimately
failed to pay back.16 After more than two decades of litigation, the
married couple sought to have the final state court judgement, which
they lost, declared null and void by a federal district court. An issue
arose from the later-filed lawsuit: the couple was attempting to obtain
other relief from that final state court judgement which was already
decided.17 The Supreme Court affirmed the federal district court in
having the lawsuit dismissed reasoning that the federal court in
essence would act as appellate courts to the final state court
judgement.18 The Supreme Court concluded that when a case has gone
through all the steps at the state level correctly, then that decision is
binding and only the Supreme Court will have the right to hear any
disputes that arise from that judgement. 19
13

28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (West).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West).
15
Andrade, 9 F.4th at 952.
16 See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414–417.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
14
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District of Colombia Court of Appeals v. Feldman involved
two bar exam applicants who asked the District of Colombia Court of
Appeals for waivers to a rule requiring bar applicants to have
graduated from an American Bar Association-approved law school.20
The court denied the bar applicants’ request, and the bar applicants
responded subsequently by challenging the denials in the United States
District Court for the District of Colombia. 21 The district court
dismissed the bar applicants’ complaint on the ground that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to state court decisions
arising out of judicial proceedings. 22 However, on appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit held that
the district court did have jurisdiction to review constitutional
challenges to the rule barring admission.23
The Rooker-Feldman Test

20

See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 466 (“In his petition, Feldman described his legal
training, work experience, and other qualifications. He suggested that his
professional training and education were “equal to that received by those who have
attended an A.B.A. approved law school.” In view of his training, experience, and
success in passing the bar examinations in other jurisdictions, Feldman stated that
“the objectives of the District of Columbia’s procedures and requirements for
admission to the Bar will not be frustrated by granting this petition.”) Id.
21 Id. at 468. The court noted that “while the Committee on Admissions had
recognized Mr. Feldman's ‘exceptional opportunity for training’” and his fine
personal qualities, the purpose of the rule at issue was “to prevent the Committee and
the Court from assuming the practicably impossible task of making separate
subjective evaluations of each applicant's training and education; hence, an objective
and reasonable standard as prescribed by the rule must be utilized.” In this light, the
court decided not to waive the rule and upheld the Committee's denial of Feldman's
application.” Id.
22 Id. at 470.
23 Id. at 487. This separation is important because as the court notes “in
deciding that the District Court has jurisdiction over those elements of the
respondents' complaints that involve a general challenge to the constitutionality of
Rule 46 I(b)(3), we expressly do not reach the question of whether the doctrine of res
judicata forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints. We leave that
question to the District Court on remand.” Id.

46
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When a plaintiff, who loses in state court, presents a new claim
in federal court that is dependent on the same operative facts from that
case which the plaintiff lost, opposing counsel will have the
opportunity to answer with a motion for summary judgment asking the
court to dismiss the claim since Rooker-Feldman has divested the
court of jurisdiction. The court will then analyze whether the RookerFeldman doctrine applies by applying a two-step test.24
The first part of the test “consider[s] whether a plaintiff's
federal claims are “‘independent’” or, instead, whether they “‘either
directly”’ challenge a state court judgment or are “‘inextricably
intertwined with one.’”25 If the claim at issue is considered to be
independent from a state court judgement, then Rooker-Feldman
cannot be used as a bar for the claim brought to federal court. 26 If a
court determines that the claim at issue either directly challenges a
state court judgement or is inextricably intertwined with one, then the
analysis proceeds to the next step. 27 Step two requires a court to
consider whether the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to present
the injury in state court proceedings, and “only if the plaintiff did have
such an opportunity does Rooker-Feldman strip federal courts of
jurisdiction.”28
Confusion Regarding the “Inextricably Intertwined” Verbiage
and What Courts Should Follow Instead
There is no doubt that the Rooker-Feldman test is not simple,
and that it does not achieve correct results all the time.29 To argue
otherwise would be to negate the various claims that have been
brought to court and dismissed for applying Rooker-Feldman

24

Op. and Order. 1, ECF No. 73.
Andrade v. Hammond, Indiana, 9 F.4th 947, 951 (7th Cir. 2021).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Beuhler, supra note 2, at 374.
25
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incorrectly.30 Although Rooker-Feldman is only analyzed when a
newly filed federal complaint is alleged to challenge a final state court
judgement,31 it is usually difficult to distinguish those cases which are
completely independent from a final state court judgement from those
that are not.32 There is usually at least some aspect of the final state
court judgement which is tied with that newly filed federal claim.33 As
mentioned before, even judges have a difficult time applying the
doctrine.34
As a result, there are important steps litigants should follow
when arguing on behalf of their client who was injured by an
administrative entity. A strong brief will contain the following: first,
the party who lost in state court (the party who filed the federal
lawsuit) sustained an injury; second, the injury must not have been
remedied; and third, the injury must have occurred before the state
court proceedings began. In short, the losing party who sustained the
injury will have to convince a federal court that the alleged injury is
completely independent of the final state court judgement.
Previously, litigants would apply the “inextricably intertwined”
verbiage when arguing under Rooker-Feldman, used both by the
Seventh Circuit and the state courts of Indiana in Andrade.
This paper advocates, in light of Andrade, that the
“inextricably intertwined” verbiage should not be used when applying
Rooker-Feldman to a case in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction. 35
Because two courts connected with Andrade, the Court of Appeals of
Indiana and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, incorrectly
mentioned the inextricably intertwined verbiage, it is not appropriate
for use in future Rooker-Feldman analyses.
Chief Judge Sykes states that the inextricably intertwined
verbiage should not be used any longer to determine cases under
30

Beuhler, supra note 2, at 375.
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923).
32 Andrade at 951.
33 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 479 (1983).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 951–54.
31
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Rooker-Feldman.36 Chief Judge Sykes ended her concurrence in
Andrade by reminding the panel that the inextricably intertwined
verbiage is the “wrong starting point” in using the doctrine. 37 Sykes
argued that using the verbiage of the inextricably intertwined doctrine
is inconsistent with the now familiar standard that comes from Exxon
Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.38
In Exxon Mobil, a case involving two subsidiaries of an
American corporation who got in a dispute over royalties with a Saudi
corporation and where the American corporation and subsidiaries filed
a federal action in the event that they might lose in state court, the U.S.
Supreme Court narrowed the use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by
clarifying that the Rooker-Feldman “doctrine is confined to cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not otherwise override
or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment doctrines that allow federal
courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state court
actions.”39
More importantly, the Court did not once mention that the
inextricably intertwined verbiage is a factor when analyzing cases
under Rooker-Feldman.40 Therefore, the inextricably intertwined
verbiage should not be used to analyze subsequent cases any longer in
this jurisdiction.
Instead, a court should continue applying the standard that
emerged from the Exxon Mobil decision.41 Judge Sykes explains it
very well, commenting that “rather than asking if the plaintiff seeks a
result that conflicts with or undermines a judgement in parallel state
litigation, Exxon directs our attention to the source of the plaintiffs’
36

Id.
Id. at 954.
38 Id.
39 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
40 Id. at 291–94.
41 See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292.
37
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injuries.42 If the plaintiff complains of an independent prior injury
caused outside the judicial process—including by other branches of
government—then Rooker-Feldman does not apply; instead,
preclusion doctrine comes into play.”43
One crucial detail worth noting is that during the Seventh
Circuit oral argument in Andrade, counsel for the city of Hammond,
the adversaries to the landlord in Andrade, furiously rejected Judge
Sykes’ interpretation of Exxon Mobil and noted that the Supreme
Court did not reject the inextricably intertwined verbiage. The Seventh
Circuit judges furiously rejected this argument in their opinion. Once
more as Judge Sykes notes, “that language is conspicuously absent
from Exxon Mobil.”44 Although there is a possibility that the Supreme
Court might one day agree with the Defendant by allowing the
inextricably intertwined verbiage to stand, until that happens litigants
should remember to follow the precedent left by Exxon Mobil.45
There is additional support for the argument that the
inextricably intertwined verbiage should be abandoned. Other courts
around the United States have also agreed that the verbiage was not
considered during the Exxon Mobil decision. For example, On August
12, 2021, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit revived a child
custody case that had already been tossed out on Rooker-Feldman
grounds. That court stated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been
applied too broadly and that its “era of expansion is over.”46
Additionally, the court commented that, “though the Supreme Court
has stepped in to restore the doctrine to its original boundaries, courts
have continued to apply Rooker-Feldman as a one-size-fits-all
preclusion doctrine for a vast array of claims relating to state court
litigation.” The court reasoned that since the plaintiff was not trying to
42

Andrade v. Hammond, Indiana, 9 F.4th 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2021).
Id.
44Oral Argument at 15:00, Andrade v. Hammond, Indiana, 9 F.4th 947, 948 (7th
Cir. 2021).
45 Id.
46 Matt Perez, 11th Circ. Says Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s ‘Expansion is Over’,
LAW360, (Nov. 10, 2021, 5:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1412342.
43
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overturn the child custody decision, but was instead seeking relief
based on other claims, that the plaintiff did not invoke the use of
Rooker-Feldman. Those claims involved violations related to
procedural due process rights, discrimination based on age, and
unreasonable search and seizure. Once again none of these claims
sought to have the child custody judgement reversed. Most
importantly was what the Eleventh Circuit had to say about the
inextricably intertwined verbiage; the court commented that the
inextricably intertwined verbiage was a huge reason that the RookerFeldman doctrine was used too broadly in the past, but that the Exxon
Mobil decision has cleared up that confusion.
Even before that, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
had ruled similarly on limiting Rooker-Feldman. That court also
reversed a decision and concluded that a bankruptcy court erred when
concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred review of
fraudulent transfer claims. The appeal focused on Sections 544 and
548 of the Bankruptcy Code, but instead of ruling on the merits, the
court ended up addressing whether Rooker-Feldman was properly
applied to bar the action from proceeding. The court’s analysis
focused on whether the plaintiff had invited the federal court to review
and reject the state court judgement. More importantly the Third
Circuit commented that the U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned against
applying Rooker-Feldman too broadly. The doctrine is confined to
“limited circumstances” where “state court losers complain[ ] of
injuries caused by state-court judgements rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgements.”47
Additionally, the clarification that Judge Sykes provides in
Andrade is important because it helps separate the preclusion doctrine
from the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—exactly what the legal
community has struggled with for decades.48 It is one thing to
47

Steven Wilamsky & Sara Ghadiri, 3rd Circ. Confirms Limits of The RookerFeldman Doctrine, LAW360, (Nov. 12, 2021, 3:10 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1004470/3rd-circ-confirms-limits-of-therooker-feldman-doctrine.
48
Andrade at 952.

51

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/3

10

Ochoa: The Return of the Inextricably Intertwined Verbiage, or Not? The

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

perpetuate widespread use of a confusing test that is not clearly
articulated—i.e., the inextricably intertwined test—but it is another
thing to confuse two separate legal doctrines. Although both legal
concepts have their own distinct analyses and reasons to be used in
court, differentiating preclusion and Rooker-Feldman principles has
proven to be quite difficult for many in the legal profession.49
Specifically, this problem originates from confusing both
“issue” and “claim” preclusion with the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
The Legal Information Institute describes claim preclusion, also
known as res judicata, as “the principle that a cause of action may not
be relitigated once it has been judged on the merits.” 50 Whereas it
defines issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, as a “valid
and final judgment [that] binds the plaintiff, defendant, and their
privies in subsequent actions on different causes of action between
them (or their privies) as to same issues actually litigated and essential
to the judgment in the first action”. 51
Although both concepts seem similar, as they each determine
whether claims or issues have already been litigated, the difference
lies in how exactly they are used. Rooker-Feldman “is a narrow
doctrine,” and “does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion
doctrine or augment doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or
dismiss proceedings in deference to state court actions.”52
Additionally, it is important to emphasize that even if a case
passes the Rooker-Feldman analysis, that doesn’t necessarily mean the
case will always be given the green light to continue in court where it
left off.53 The court in Exxon Mobil stated that

49

Id.
LII / Legal Information Institute, Res judicata, (Nov. 10, 2021),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata.
51
LII / Legal Information Institute, issue preclusion, (Nov. 10, 2021),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/issue_preclusion.
52
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005).
53
See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.
50
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“§ 1257 [does not] stop a district court from exercising
subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to
litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state
court. If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent
claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state
court has reached in a case to which he was a party ..., then
there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the
defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” 54
One way of summarizing the difference between the preclusion
principles and Rooker-Feldman doctrine comes from GASH
Associates v. Village of Rosemont, Illinois55 The court in GASH stated
that
equating the Rooker–Feldman doctrine with preclusion is
natural; both sets of principles define the respect one court
owes to an earlier judgment. But the two are not coextensive.
Preclusion in federal litigation following a judgment in state
court depends on the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, which requires the federal court to give the judgment
the same effect as the rendering state would. When the state
judgment would not preclude litigation in state court of an
issue that turns out to be important to a federal case, the
federal court may proceed; otherwise not. 56 The Rooker–
Feldman doctrine, by contrast, has nothing to do with § 1738.
It rests on the principle that district courts have only original
jurisdiction; the full appellate jurisdiction over judgments of
54

Id. at 293.
GASH Assocs v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1993) (GASH
Associates involved a junior mortgagee who commenced a civil rights action against
the village of Rosemont alleging that the village engaged in a “taking of GASH
Associate’s property. Judgement was entered and GASH Associates appealed. The
Court of Appeals decided that the District Court was precluded from exercising
jurisdiction since GASH Associates had no independent claim and was instead
attacking the state court judgement).
55

53
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state courts in civil cases lies in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and parties have only a short time to invoke
that jurisdiction. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine asks: is the
federal plaintiff seeking to set aside a state judgment, or does
he present some independent claim, albeit one that denies a
legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to
which he was a party? If the former, then the district court
lacks jurisdiction; if the latter, then there is jurisdiction and
state law determines whether the defendant prevails under
principles of preclusion.57
Indeed, as Chief Judge Sykes of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals explains in Andrade, “the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar
is not founded in respect for state courts or other comity of federalism
interests. It derives from silence in several jurisdictional statutes, most
proximately 28 U.S.C. § 1257”. 58
After reviewing the information above, it is fair to say we are
decently well-versed on the law of the case. The focus on becoming
experts on the facts and record of the case follows in the next
sections.59
The Case
Jose Andrade, a landlord of the city of Hammond, Indiana, has
been litigating his case for the last 9 years. 60 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals recently sided with the small landlord in what
appears to be a huge blow to the city of Hammond. 61 The case began
in the spring of 2013 when the City of Hammond—more specifically,
57

Id. at 728.
Andrade at 951–52.
59 Id.
60 Dolan, B., Landlord wins ruling against Hammond, NWI Times. (Nov. 1,
2021), https://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/landlord-wins-ruling-againsthammond/article_2f5867a7-c086-5e3f-b43e-4b25109e4341.html.
61 Id.
58

54
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city employees—went to inspect Jose Andrade’s commercial
apartment for alleged safety violations. The employees later found that
Jose Andrade was in violation of multiple city ordinances.62 It is
important to note that Jose Andrade was considered a Section 8
Housing landlord when he was cited. Section 8 housing is a form of
subsidized housing for individuals who meet a certain threshold and
who are assisted by the U.S. government in making payments to their
landlords.63
After Jose Andrade was notified of the citation, he filed a state
court action arguing that the city had “engaged in patterned course of
action starting March 15, 2013 in a calculated effort to deny Andrade
full use and benefit of his rental property.”64 Some examples that
Andrade gave include how the city:
(1) improperly labeled his rental property as uninhabitable;
(2) attempted to enforce building codes which they had no
authority to enforce; (3) threatened him with fines; (4)
required unnecessary and inappropriate modifications to his
property; (5) unlawfully enforced zoning ordinances and
other regulations; (6) denied him his valid liberty interest in
his property; (7) denied his tenants the right to federal
housing choice vouchers; (8) maliciously prosecuted him;
and (9) conducted administrative hearings without adequate
notice or the opportunity to confront witnesses.
This state court action was then removed to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.65

62

Andrade v. City of Hammond, 2:15-CV-134-TLS, 2020 WL 30227, at 1
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2020).
63 Housing Choice Voucher Program Section 8, HUD.gov / U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 (last
visited Oct 8, 2021).
64 Andrade at 1.
65 Id. at 1–2.
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Although Andrade’s case remained pending in federal court,
the state administrative proceedings for the violations continued, and
on January 12, 2017, an evidentiary hearing was conducted regarding
whether Andrade’s rental property was in unsafe condition. 66 Two city
employees, a building commissioner, and a former code enforcement
commissioner, testified at length about the unsafe conditions. 67 The
board hearing the proceedings eventually concluded that Andrade’s
property was unsafe, illegally constructed, and that it had to be
restored back to a single-family home.68 Andrade, furious with the
decision, appealed that administrative decision to the Superior Court
of Lake County, a state trial court. Andrade argued that (1) the board
acted beyond its legal authority, (2) the property was originally built
and zoned as a multi-family unit, and (3) the Defendants failed to
comply with a subpoena.69 Nonetheless, the trial court ended up siding
with the city since those arguments were not central to the underlying
issue of whether the property was an unsafe building, and since
Andrade failed to demonstrate that the board’s decision was
unreasonable.70 The trial court concluded that the board’s findings
were well supported by the record. Andrade, determined to have the
trial court’s decision reversed, appealed to the Indiana Court of
Appeals arguing that:
the board’s actions violated the Takings Clause, (2) one of
the board members acted improperly or acted from bias, (3)
the board exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered
him to restore the property to a single-family home, (4) the
board’s finding that the property was originally built as a
single family residence was not supported by substantial
evidence, and (5) the Defendants’ failure to comply with a

66

Id.
Id.
68 Id. at 3.
69 Id. at 4.
70 Id.
67

56

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

subpoena required that the board’s decision be reversed.”71
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order
and dismissed the other arguments. 72 Andrade then petitioned
to both the Indiana Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
the United States who both denied hearing the case.73
As noted earlier, Jose Andrade’s complaint was still pending in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Hammond. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine had divested the court of
jurisdiction, and (2) the Plaintiff’s claims were now barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The District Court agreed that RookerFeldman applied to the case and dismissed the suit. 74
Putting the Pieces Together
The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
primarily relied on three cases when deciding that Rooker-Feldman
barred federal review of Andrade’s injury. The most important case
the court relied on was Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue.75 In
Swartz, the Swartz’ were owners of various farm animals. 76 After an
investigation, an Indiana trial court determined that the Swartz’
engaged in animal cruelty and thereafter issued an order to seize the
animals while making the Swartz’ pay for the fees for the animal
shelter that would take care of their adoption. 77 Following the state
proceedings, the Swartz’ filed a federal lawsuit challenging the seizure
71

Id. at 5.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 20. (Specifically, the District Court said “plaintiff’s allegations are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.” And thereafter granted defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgement.
75 Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2019).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 389.
72
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of their animals in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.78 The district court ended up finding in favor of
defendants based on Rooker-Feldman.79 The court reasoned that
because the injury for the federal lawsuit, the seizure and placement of
the animals, came from several orders of a state trial court, their claims
were inextricably intertwined with the state court judgements. 80
On a superficial level, one could argue that Andrade is very
similar to Swartz. In Andrade, the plaintiff’s property was inspected,
the administrative agency reviewed the evidence and made
determinations, and the judicial system agreed with those
determinations. The difference between these cases is the fact that the
injury Andrade alleged took place before there was any judicial
involvement. Reminding ourselves of Judge Sykes’s words,
“ultimately, the determination hinges on whether the federal claim
alleges that the injury was caused by the state court judgment, or
alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges an independent prior
injury that the state court failed to remedy.’” 81 Here, Andrade
complained of an independent prior injury while Swartz complained of
an injury that stemmed from a judicial decision, the order to capture
the animals.
Next Steps for Jose Andrade
Andrade provides precedent to many landlords since it will
allow future landlords the right to bring forward injuries which were
never remedied and that were caused by administrative branches of
government. Once again, these injuries must be independent of state
court judgement, but if they are, then a party will not be barred by
Rooker-Feldman in having a federal court review the injury. 82
Although Jose Andrade prevailed at the Seventh Circuit, the reality is
78

Id.
Id. at 394.
80 Id.
81 Andrade v. Hammond, Indiana, 9 F.4th 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2021).
79
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that Andrade still must get through the preclusion barrier. It is most
likely that the preclusion principles will dictate whether the case will
continue or whether it will be barred proceeding. Additionally, the
federal district court will now be able to analyze Andrade's claim that
his due process rights were violated by the board, and whether that's a
sufficient basis for the lawsuit to continue. Andrade’s attorney
commented on the matter also stating that “Mr. Andrade and I fully
expect other efforts to derail a trial by the mayor and the city, but we
remain confident we will prevail on all counts.” 83 On the contrary,
Hammond Mayor Thomas McDermott, Jr. has stated that it is a top
priority for his administration to protect and eliminate unsafe
apartments what were created illegally out of single-family homes.84
Conclusion
To conclude, in Judge Sykes’ words, “it’s worth reiterating,
then, what the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is (and isn’t).”85 Although
the legal community continues to struggle with properly applying
Rooker-Feldman at times, it still holds to be an important doctrine in
the litigation world. Sykes reminds us of the correct approach that
lawyers and judges should take when analyzing Rooker-Feldman
primarily by sticking to its precedent in Exxon Mobil. As for the
inextricably intertwined language, it may be best that the legal
community let the phrase die out because “that small change could go
a long way toward correcting the lingering misconceptions about
Rooker–Feldman’s reach.”86
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Dan Carden, Landlord gets another change to challenge order to remove
apartments from single-family dwelling, NWI TIMES (Nov. 20, 2021, 11:08 AM),
https://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/hammond/landlord-gets-anotherchance-to-challenge-order-to-remove-apartments-from-single-familydwelling/article_f82f5b42-e85e-5054-999c-368e8eebafe0.html.
84 See Carden, supra note 84.
85 Id. at 954.
86 Id.

59

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/3

18

